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Abstract 
 
  When purchasing goods of uncertain future value, market prices should reflect the 
market’s best estimate of the future value of the good.  Further, market price should, on average, 
perform well in predicting the realization of future value.  In this paper, we test the market’s 
ability to aggregate information and thereby predict future value in the Thoroughbred racing 
industry.  Using sales data from weanling, yearling, and two-year-old sales, we hypothesize that 
as more and/or better information becomes available, price should become a better predictor of 
outcomes (earnings).  Results indicate that any information that becomes available between 
weanling and yearling sales does not improve prediction of earnings, but information on the 




Key Words:     Efficient Markets Hypothesis, Information aggregation, Thoroughbred industry  1.  Introduction 
  When purchasing goods of uncertain future value (for example, an offshore oil lease, a 
stock, or a Thoroughbred racehorse), market prices should reflect the market’s best estimate of 
the future value of the good.  Further, market price should, on average, perform well in 
predicting the realization of future value.
1  In this paper, we test, indirectly, the market’s ability 
to aggregate information and thereby predict future value in the Thoroughbred racing industry.   
  In Thoroughbred racing, racehorse prospects are sold as weanlings, yearlings and two-
year olds.  As a horse ages, more information about the potential of that horse becomes available.  
For example, the conformation, temperament, and trainability of the horse become more certain 
in the 6 to 9 months between the weanling and yearling sales.  When the horse turns two, they 
begin to enter training, revealing yet further information about the horse’s ability.  Especially 
relevant in this analysis is that before the two-year-old sales (which are called “two-year-old in 
training” sales), prospective buyers can actually watch the horse perform over a designated 
distance (usually 1 to 2 furlongs, or 1/8 to 1/4 mile).  Consequently, prospective buyers can 
observe a horse’s running style and speed over a short distance.  In this sense, buyers have 
significantly more information on which to determine prices than at weanling or yearling sales.
2  
We hypothesize that as more and/or better information becomes available, price should become a 
better predictor of outcomes. 
  Recently, the efficient markets hypothesis has received support from the popularity and 
usefulness of prediction markets, which are financial markets also referred to as “information 
                                                            
1 Under the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama (1970)), if prices fully aggregate information (both private and 
public), then the inclusion of additional information will not improve price’s ability to forecast the future value. 
2 In addition, as a horse ages, new information regarding the horse’s dam and sire becomes available.  This 
information includes quality of dam and sire progeny (i.e. new race winners, stakes race winners, etc) as well as 
breeding quality of siblings. This information should also lead to a more accurate assessment of a horse’s ability and 
hence and hence future value markets” or “event futures.”  In such markets, market prices are used to predict future events; 
one of the most well-known examples of prediction markets is the Iowa Electronic Market.  
Wolfers and Zitzweitz (2004) provide a useful overview of the many types and applications of 
prediction markets in use today.  Among other things, they illustrate the power of prediction 
markets by using data generated in the Iowa market for the previous four presidential elections.  
They show that the average absolute forecast error generated by market trading as a function of 
days to the election is diminishing; as more information becomes available leading into an 
election, market forecasts, dictated by share prices in the market, improve.   
   In this paper, we explore fundamentally the same issue.  We use auction data for prices 
and career racing earnings for outcomes on all horses from the 1993 thoroughbred foal crop that 
sold as weanlings, yearlings, and/or two-year olds.  Examining the ability of price to predict 
earnings, we ask if the prices from two-year old sales outperform prices from weanling and 
yearling sales as a predictor of earnings.  
  Section 2 of this paper outlines the data, and Section 3 discusses the empirical 
methodology.  We employ a permutation test to examine if the predictive power measured by 
(adjusted) R
2 for a regression of earnings on price within age group supports the hypothesis that 




  Our data are comprised of 15,124 North American born Thoroughbred race horses from 
the 1993 foal crop that sold at least once as a weanling, yearling, or two-year old.  In 1993, 36,455 Thoroughbreds were born in North America and registered with the Jockey Club as 
racing prospects.
3  From this foal crop, roughly 41% were sold as either a weanling, yearling, or 
two-year old.
4  Weanling sales are predominantly held in November and December of each year 
prior to a horse officially turning 1 year old.  The majority of yearling sales are between April 
and September of each year, while the majority of two-year old in training sales are held between 
February and April.   
  The sample is drawn from auction summaries published by The Blood-Horse, a leading 
industry publication.  In those summaries, sale prices for individual horses are available, along 
with information regarding each horse’s pedigree, consignor, and buyer.  Career racetrack 
earnings are recovered from the 2009 edition of the American Produce Records; this publication 
consists of the produce record (name, racing performance, and sales performance for each foal) 
of every mare that produced a foal in North America between 1960 and 2008.  We use the 1993 
foal crop to insure that the horses in our sample have completed their racing careers.  
Descriptions of the variables used in the study are presented in Table 1, and summary statistics 
for the full sample are presented in Table 2. 
  We observe that mean earnings rise with age at sale, including an approximately 19% 
increase from weanling to yearling sales horses and a roughly 26% increase from yearling to 
two-year old sales horses.  Examining price, we observe a 22% increase in prices from weanling 
to yearling sales, which is near the increase in mean earnings, while mean price increases by only 
6% between yearling two-year old sales, a substantially lower increase as compared to mean 
                                                            
3 For a Thoroughbred to be sold as a racing prospect or appear in a race, it must be registered with the Jockey Club, 
which verifies that the horse is from recognized thoroughbred bloodlines.   
4 For official purposes, all Thoroughbreds are considered to have a birth date of January 1.   earnings.  The change in mean prices across sales does not match the change in mean realized 
earnings.
5 
  The final column of Table 2 presents the coefficient of variation (CV).  We note that the 
CV for price is close 2 for each age group, with the two-year-old CV being slightly lower.  The 
CV for earnings is consistently higher for earnings across age groups.  This is unsurprising as we 
might expect more noise in earnings.  It is difficult, for example, to forecast a career-ending 
injury that occurs before a horse is able to race.  If anything, the summary statistics indicate 
considerably more noise in two-year old earnings bur less variability in prices.  This would 
appear to indicate weaker predictive ability of price in the two-year-old sample. 
  At this point, we must address the issue of residual breeding value.  The purchase price of 
a Thoroughbred reflects the net present expected value of its racetrack earnings and its residual 
breeding value.  For horses that go on to have successful careers in the breeding shed, breeding 
value can be quite high.  However, less than 1% of colts from any foal crop will even stand at 
stud for a few years, and the majority of them will be unsuccessful; for the average colt, expected 
breeding value is zero.  Alternatively, mares are much more likely to enter the breeding shed.  It 
is estimated that about 50% of all females will produce at least one offspring.  Thus most fillies 
will have some positive expected value in breeding.  To accommodate this potential noise in our 
data, we perform the test detailed in the next section on different sub-samples of the data.  An 
exhaustive list of these subsamples is as follows: colts, fillies, non-select horses, non-select colts, 
                                                            
5 Among the horses sold as two-year olds, were three horses that earned in excess of 3 million dollars, with these 
horses selling for $30,000, $90,000 and $200,000.  If we drop these horses from the two year old sample, the mean 
total earnings for two-year olds drops 48,367 with a standard deviation of 116,545.60.  We observe that the standard 
deviation in both prices and earnings are lower in weanling and yearling sales but, dropping the extreme earners 
from the two-year old sample, the standard deviation in price and earnings is quite similar between yearling and 
two-year old sales.   
 non-select fillies, select horses, select colts, and select fillies.
6  In addition, as we will discuss in 
Section 4, the results seem to be robust to the potential presence of residual breeding value. 
 
3. Empirical  Methodology 
  We hypothesize that because prices aggregate information, the price of a Thoroughbred 
at auction should predict racetrack quality as measured by career earnings; moreover, sales prices 
of older horses should outperform sales prices of younger horses as a predictor of earnings.  To 
test this hypothesis, we regress the natural log of earnings (LN_EARN) as a function of the 
natural log of prices (LN_PRICE) for weanling, yearling and two-year old sales.  A natural 
measure of the predictive power of a regression model is the R
2, which in this context is 




t (t = 0,1,2) as the adjusted R
2 recovered from a regression of auction price on career 
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6 Select sales are ones in which individuals with only the highest quality pedigrees and conformation are presented 
for sale; these are the individuals, particularly among the colts, most likely to have a large positive expected residual 
breeding value.   
7 We will use the adjusted R
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  There is no standard statistical method available to test these hypotheses. Fisher (1935), 
however, proposes an alternative testing procedure that is commonly referred to as a 
“randomization” or “permutation” test.  A randomization test involves calculating some test 
statistic, m, based on the observed data.  The distribution of the statistic is found by randomly 
reordering the data a sufficiently large number of times and recalculating the test statistic for 
each reordering.  Consider, for example, asking whether Thoroughbred buyers pay higher 
average prices for male (colts) or female (fillies) racing prospects.
8  Using a sample of auction 
prices, we could calculate the mean for colts and fillies, respectively.  The permutation test then 
involves randomly relabeling an observation as either a colt or filly (irrespective of the 
observations actual gender), preserving the number of horses in each group.
9  The difference in 
means is then calculated for each relabeling; this forms the distribution of the test statistic, which 
in this case is the difference in means.  The significance level is then recovered as the percentage 
of observations that are at least as extreme as the observed value.  If this probability value is 
small, then the observed pattern would seem unlikely if the null hypothesis were true.   
  The permutation test then involves three steps: (1) calculate the observed statistic, (2) 
randomly reorder the data many times and calculate the test statistic for each reordering, (3) find 
the proportion of values (the p-value) that are at least as extreme as the observed statistic, and (4) 
conclude against the null hypothesis if the p-value is small. 
                                                            
8 We might expect colts to command higher average prices because the purses for races run predominantly by males 
are on average larger.   
9 Under Fisher’s (1935) original development, we would consider every permutation but for large samples this 
become impractical and is unnecessary for reliable results.   Consider the first of our three hypotheses given in (1).  The alternative suggests a 
particular pattern to the data; more specifically, it indicates that the adjusted R
2 in a regression of 
auction price on earnings for two-year old sales is greater than for yearling sales, while the null 
suggests that if this pattern is observed in the data, it is little more than a chance event.  To test 
the hypothesis, we first recover the difference in adjusted R




1) from the observed 
data.  Next, we randomly re-label the observations across the three sales, preserving the 
proportion of observations in each sale, and again recover the difference in adjusted R
2.  
Repeating this process 10,000 times determines the distribution of the test-statistic.  From this 
distribution, we calculate the p-value for our hypothesis as the percentage of values in the 
constructed distribution that lie above our observed value.   
4. Results 
 Regression  results  of  LN_EARN on LN_PRICE, by age and within different subsamples, 
are presented in Table 3.  The first set of regression results utilizes the full sample; the remaining 
sets or results utilize different subsets of the data.   
  In all but one model, LN_PRICE is a significant predictor of LN_EARN at the 5% level or 
better (the lone exception occurs in the model restricted to select two-year-old colts; LN_PRICE 
is nowhere near conventional levels of significance).  However, one immediately notices that 
adjusted R
2 values are quite low.  The highest adjusted R
2 occurs in the sample of two-year-old 
colts in which roughly 10% of the variation in earnings is explained by the variation in prices.  
One possible reason for this inefficiency is that this market, like prediction markets, may exhibit 
some of the same behavioral biases as other financial markets, such as overweighting 
probabilities of unlikely extreme outcome events (finding the “home run” horse) and underweighting likely extreme outcome events (finding a zero-earnings runner).  Since finding a 
racehorse that makes substantial earnings on the track (or in the breeding shed) are small 
probability events, this auction market may not work as well as in other, more moderate-
probability environments.  Another behavioral bias relevant to the Thoroughbred racing industry 
is the tendency of buyers to bid and purchase according to personal preferences rather than 
objective probability assessments of a horse’s future performance (see Rhode and Strumpf 
(2008) and Forsythe, Reitz, and Ross (1999)).  Finally, horse racing is wrought with uncertainty 
even before a horse runs its first race; it is impossible to forecast a career-ending injury that may 
occur while a young horse romps in the paddock before training has even commenced. 
  Table 4 reports the test statistic and p-value for the permutation test in each subsample.  
Excluding the “select” sub-samples, we find that in the entire sample and the fillies subsample, 
the difference in adjusted R
2 between yearlings and weanlings is significant at the 10% level.  
Otherwise, this difference is not statistically significant, which suggests that information 
revealed between the weanling and yearling sales is either not fully incorporated into prices or is 
of little use in predicting future racing quality. 
  Again excluding the “select” sub-samples, all differences in adjusted R
2 between two-
year-olds and either yearlings or weanlings are significant at the 1% level.  The robustness of this 
result is not entirely surprising since, as mentioned earlier, prospective buyers can actually watch 
two-year-olds perform over a designated distance a few days before the sale.  In weanling and 
yearling sales, prospective buyers merely analyze the horse’s conformation and observe them 
walking up and down the shed row; their pricing decisions are based on these observations 
(along with pedigree).  From our results, we can infer that watching two-year-olds perform at their intended task is informative, and hence prices more accurately predict the horse’s future 
racetrack earnings. 
  The results are less clear in the sub-samples of select sale horses.  Since there are no 
select sales for weanlings, we can only compare models for yearlings and two-year-olds.  In the 
sample of select horses, the difference in adjusted R
2 is significant at the 5% level, while the 
differences are significant only at the 10% level when select colts and select fillies are analyzed 
separately.  One possible explanation for the diminished significance of results is that horses sold 
at select sales have high-quality pedigrees, and hence these individuals have significant residual 
breeding value.  This residual breeding value factors into their sale price but may not be a strong 
indicator of racetrack earnings, especially since horses with high residual breeding value may 
end their racing careers early to take advantage of their potential profitability in the breeding 
shed. 
  Taken together, we conclude that information which becomes available between the 
weanling and yearling sales is of little value in predicting future racetrack performance, since 
weanling and yearling sales prices predict earnings with a similar degree of accuracy.  However, 
information accumulated before the two-year-old sales is valuable in determining career 
earnings, and moreover, prices aggregate this information and become better predictors of 
racetrack quality.  Thus, at least to some extent, prices serve to help predict future outcomes in 
the Thoroughbred racing industry, but the degree of error is still quite large as evidenced by the 
low adjusted R
2 values. 
 5.  Summary and Conclusion   According to the efficient markets hypothesis, market prices should reflect the market’s 
best estimate of the future value of the good, and market price should perform well in predicting 
the realization of future value.  In this paper, we test the market’s ability to aggregate 
information and thereby predict future racing value in the Thoroughbred racing industry.   
  We find that information which becomes available between the yearling and two-year-old 
sales is most useful in terms of predicting future racing value; two-year-old sale prices are better 
predictors of earnings than either weanling or yearling sale prices.  Moreover, there is little 
difference in the ability of weanling and yearling sales prices to predict earnings.  Further, in all 
three age groups, price is a highly significant variable in predicting earnings, yet very little 
variation in earnings is explained.  So, these markets are efficient in the sense that prices 
aggregate available information and predict earnings better, but not in the sense that prices do a 
satisfactory job of explaining earnings, as the highest adjusted R
2 was less than 0.10.  
  If a market is truly efficient, the market price will be the best predictor of the future 
event, and no other available information will aide in improving the market’s predictions.  While 
there are many potential reasons regarding why Thoroughbred auction markets are not terribly 
efficient, future research will include other variables to the regression models to determine what 
information, if any, is over- or under-weighted by the market. 
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Dependent Variable    
EARN  n/a Career  earnings 
Independent Variable    
PRICE  +  Auction price at weanling, yearling, or two-year-old sale 
 
































TABLE 3 – Regression results for all subsamples of the data 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_EARN 



















































2  0.0145 0.0340 0.0815 0.0247 0.0432 0.0939 0.0055 0.0223 0.0649 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_EARN 



















































2  0.0145 0.0314 0.0711 0.0145 0.0314 0.0711 0.0145 0.0314 0.0711 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_EARN 







































* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively TABLE 4 – Permutation test results on all subsamples of the data 




** 0.0250   






Year-Wean 0.0184 0.1214   







* 0.0783   







* 0.0651   







Year-Wean 0.0143 0.1763   







Year-Wean 0.0139 0.1332   




Select  Two-Year 0.0764
** 0.0287  269 
Select Colts  Two-Year 0.0203
* 0.0576 162 
Select Fillies  Two-Year 0.1322




* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 